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Abstract 40 
In this paper we explore the new orientation taken by Spanish water policy since the 41 
beginning of the 21st century and very specifically the shift towards desalination as an 42 
alternative to other water supply options such as river regulation or inter-basin water 43 
transfers. Desalination has been seen as the cure for everything that dams and inter-44 
basin water transfers were unable to solve, including droughts, scarcities, social 45 
conflicts, environmental impacts, and political rivalries among the different Spanish 46 
regions. Desalination also means a new and powerful element in water planning and 47 
management that could provide water for the continuous expansion of the urban and 48 
tourist growth machine in Mediterranean Spain and thus relax possible water constraints 49 
on this growth. However, by 2012 most new desalination plants along the 50 
Mediterranean coast remained almost idle. Focusing on the case of the Mancomunidad 51 
de Canales del Taibillla in South-eastern Spain, our aim is to develop a critical, 52 
integrated and reflexive perspective on the use of desalination as a source of water for 53 
urban and regional growth. 54 
Keywords: desalination, urban growth, drought, alternative water sources, AGUA 55 
Program, Mediterranean Spain. 56 
 57 
1. Introduction 58 
In this paper we explore the new orientation taken by Spanish water policy since the 59 
beginning of the 21st century and very specifically the shift towards desalination as an 60 
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alternative (Jefatura del Estado, 2004, 2005 and Ambienta, 2006) to other conflict-61 
ridden water supply options such as river regulation or inter-basin water transfers 62 
(Masjuan et al., 2008). Using Mediterranean Spain, and especially the areas served by 63 
the Mancomunidad de los Canales del Taibilla (provinces of Alicante and Murcia), as a 64 
case study, our aim in this paper is to develop a critical perspective on the use of 65 
desalination as a source of water for urban and regional growth. In the context of 66 
repeated droughts, likely to increase in the future because of climate change, and the 67 
economic, social and environmental costs of conventional, large-scale water supply 68 
options such as dams and inter-basin water transfers, desalination appears as a sort of 69 
“cornucopia” able in principle to solve future water needs of urban expansion in Spain 70 
(Swyngedouw, 2013). As President Kennedy envisaged more than fifty years ago, “no 71 
water resources program is of greater long-range importance than our efforts to convert 72 
water from the world’s greatest and cheapest natural resources – our oceans – into water 73 
fit for our homes and industry. Such a break-through would end bitter struggles between 74 
neighbors, states and nations” (cited in Krishna, 2004, p. 1). Likewise, proponents of 75 
desalination in Spain argue that it is one of the technologies with a greatest capacity to 76 
solve water supply problems in coastal Mediterranean Spain and may become therefore 77 
a key resource for urban and regional growth in this area (Estevan, 2008a). Because it 78 
taps a seemingly endless source of water, desalination effectively removes the 79 
climatological and hydrological constraints associated with continental water resources 80 
(Feitelson and Rosenthal, 2012), and, more importantly perhaps in political terms, 81 
circumvents the social opposition and conflict increasingly associated with river 82 
regulation through dam building and long-distance inter-basin water transfers (Saurí, 83 
2003). Desalination is not, of course, problem free. Energy availability and costs may be 84 
important, especially when compared with other water supply options (Domènech et al., 85 
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2013). In this sense, in Spain desalination costs have been compared with the cost of 86 
long-distance water transfers with conflicting evidence on which alternative is more 87 
cost-efficient (compare, for example Prats and Melgarejo, 2006 with Valero et al., 88 
2001). Moreover, the impacts of brine on oceanic life could be very damaging (Dawoud 89 
and Al Mulla, 2012) and there is still considerable uncertainty on other impacts such as 90 
the loss of marine life during water intake operations or the release of chemicals used in 91 
the desalination process through the brine.  92 
Our objective in this paper will be to examine the so-called AGUA Program 93 
(Actuaciones para la gestión y el uso del agua, Actions for Water Use and 94 
Management) developed by the Spanish Ministry of the Environment in 2004 as an 95 
alternative to long-distance water transfers. This plan, while including some water-96 
saving and efficiency improvement initiatives, was mainly aimed at building an 97 
important number of desalination plants along the Spanish Mediterranean coast to 98 
provide water for agricultural, urban and tourist uses (Jefatura del Estado, 2004, 2005 99 
and Ambienta, 2006). Our socio-political and socio-environmental assessment of this 100 
Program focuses particularly on the economic costs of desalination in a context of 101 
competition with other water supply sources, of declining demand in many 102 
municipalities and of the collapse of the real estate sector in Mediterranean Spain since 103 
2008. Taking as an example the Mancomunidad de los Canales del Taibilla (MCT) our 104 
analysis demonstrates that despite that desalination increases security of supplies in 105 
times of drought and has a number of advantages regarding other options it hardly 106 
represents the ultimate water source able to put an end to scarcity for all users.  107 
Our sources of information for this paper have been published literature on the subject, 108 
the critical reading of a number of official reports (especially the viability reports of a 109 
number of water desalination plants in Alicante and Murcia prepared by the public 110 
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company Acuamed; see Ministerio de Agricultura, Alimentación y Medio Ambiente, 111 
2013a and Acuamed 2013a, 2013b), and informal conversations with water planners 112 
and managers of the Mancomunidad de los Canales del Taibilla (Andrés Martínez, pers. 113 
comm., 2013) and Alicante’s water company (Asunción Martínez, pers. comm., 2013). 114 
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we examine desalination in the context 115 
of water planning and management. In section 3 we trace a brief history of desalination 116 
in Spain with a special emphasis on the so-called AGUA Program of 2004, which was 117 
responsible for the current expansion of desalination in this country. In section 4 we 118 
focus on the specific case of the Mancomunidad de los Canales del Taibilla (MCT) for 119 
which we examine the recent evolution of water supply sources and, in particular, the 120 
situation of desalination plants vis à vis other water sources. In section 5 we situate 121 
desalination in the context of the current real estate crisis and diminishing water demand 122 
affecting the study area. Finally, we will critically assess the reality of desalination in 123 
the study area and the possible implications of the lessons learned in this case for other 124 
areas interested in developing desalination projects. This last section points out to the 125 
need, not only in Spain, but also in other parts of the world, of a better integration 126 
between water planning and urban and regional planning, as well as a more integrated 127 
consideration of water supply sources, with accurate assessments in terms of water use 128 
and cost. 129 
 130 
2. Desalination in the context of water planning and management  131 
The genesis and development of cities cannot be understood without tracing how water 132 
has been mobilized in order to facilitate urban growth. In this process, water supply and 133 
sanitation infrastructures are critical as they mediate flows of nature and power (Castán 134 
Broto and Bulkeley, 2013) and become historical products of human-nature interactions 135 
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(Gandy, 2002, Kaika, 2005 and March, 2013). From the use of local resources, such as 136 
groundwater, to the transportation of water through long-distance aqueducts and the 137 
development of desalination plants, the water cycle has been increasingly humanized 138 
since the Industrial Revolution, making possible the massive concentration of people in 139 
cities. Most recently and in a similar fashion, the development of massive water 140 
infrastructure has made possible the growth and consolidation of large tourist resorts in 141 
many parts of the world as well (see, for instance, Gössling et al., 2012). 142 
The large amounts of capital involved and the urgent need to enlarge water availability 143 
throughout the 20th century led to the prevalence of centralized approaches to water 144 
supply. This is what could be called “the hydraulic paradigm” or, in other words, the 145 
control by the state of all matters regarding water planning and management with an 146 
emphasis on technological solutions (Saurí and del Moral, 2001). Water-supply systems 147 
developed along those principles have produced large benefits to the population by 148 
improving the reliability of provision, reducing water-related diseases associated with 149 
poor water quality, and containing the vagaries of climate and the impacts of extreme 150 
hydrologic events such as floods and droughts. On the other hand, conventional water 151 
supply systems (including dams and water transfers) have also produced large costs, 152 
including ecological and environmental degradation, social disruption associated with 153 
infrastructure, and economic and financial problems (World Commission on Dams, 154 
2000 and Gleick, 2003).  155 
As the most recent mutation of the “hydraulic paradigm”, desalination has massively 156 
expanded in the recent years across the world. According to Swyngedouw (2013), 157 
desalination is being presented increasingly as a techno-social fix, against the pressures 158 
of urbanization, climate change and population on freshwater resources. As the World 159 
Health Organization (2011, p.1) recognizes: “desalination is increasingly being used to 160 
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provide drinking-water under conditions of freshwater scarcity. […] This situation 161 
[water scarcity] is expected to worsen as competing needs for water intensify along with 162 
population growth, urbanization, climate change impacts and increases in household 163 
and industrial uses”. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) (Bates et 164 
al., 2008) presents desalination as a potential option, together with wastewater reuse, to 165 
adapt to the impacts of climate change, especially in arid and semi-arid regions. 166 
Desalination thus may contribute to enhance water security, and can “yield a reliable 167 
long-term water supply with the flexibility to be decommissioned if not needed” 168 
(Baldwin and Uhlman, 2010, p.195). 169 
Nonetheless, desalination presents a series of contradictions and problems. First and as 170 
said before, desalination may have deleterious effects on marine ecosystems (Sadhwani 171 
et al., 2005 and Bernat et al., 2010). Second, and more relevant for the purposes of this 172 
paper, desalination implies high-energy consumption and CO2 emissions (Meerganz 173 
von Medeazza, 2004, Sadhwani et al., 2005, Bates et al., 2008 and Bernat et al., 2010). 174 
In this sense, the water-energy nexus (Gober, 2010 and Siddiqi and Diaz Anadon, 2011) 175 
becomes especially evident with desalination due to the high amounts of energy needed 176 
to desalt water. While the average cost of a unit of water used in Spain is 0.45 kWh/m3 177 
(this figure includes water-related electricity consumption before the final use of the 178 
water) (Hardy et al., 2012) desalination requires between 3.5 KWh/m3 (under ideal 179 
conditions) to 5 kWh/m3 (the modern plants with reverse osmosis) or more in the older 180 
plants (Instituto para la Diversificación y Ahorro de la Energía (IDAE), 2010; see also 181 
Bernat et al., 2010).  182 
In any case, the economic cost of desalted water may vary depending on plant 183 
capacities, the type of water (brackish or seawater), the type of energy used 184 
(conventional, photovoltaic, etc.), water salinity, location (costs of labor and energy 185 
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subsidies), capacity of the desalination plant, and desalination technology used (Multi-186 
Stage Flash distillation or Reverse Osmosis) (see Karagiannis and Soldatos, 2008). For 187 
instance large desalination plants in Spain (with a capacity over 100,000 m3/day), 188 
according to Bernat et al. (2010) using Reverse Osmosis may obtain freshwater from 189 
seawater at a cost between 0.36-0.53 euros/m3 (as we will discuss later, other authors 190 
have calculated higher costs). However, as mentioned, these costs are highly dependent 191 
of location. Thus, Rygaard et al. (2011) point out to production costs ranging from 0.9-192 
2.2 dollars/m3 in countries such as Australia or Singapore. These figures may be higher 193 
for final consumers due to distribution costs from the plant to the point of consumption 194 
(especially if the consumers are located far away from the plant and/or in higher 195 
altitudes) and other operation and maintenance costs. Furthermore, costs may be subject 196 
to the fluctuations of electricity prices (see below for the Spanish case). At any rate, the 197 
high price of desalted water compared to traditional sources may imply the likely 198 
underutilization of desalination plants (see Rico Amorós, 2010 for the Spanish case). 199 
Along these lines, as Meerganz von Medeazza (2004) argues, desalination (an 200 
apparently endless source) might solve physical water scarcity in arid environments, but 201 
on the other hand it may create relative scarcity as it might propel an increase in water 202 
demand due to the growing expectations of large (and wealthy) consumers, while other 203 
users with lower ability to pay could not afford to buy desalted water.  204 
Because of these and other impacts, some authors, such as Barnett and O’Neill (2010) 205 
or McEvoy and Wilder (2010 and 2012), consider desalination as a maladaptation to 206 
climate change because it may stress the water-energy nexus, at the same time that may 207 
contribute to greenhouse emissions and other environmental impacts. Furthermore 208 
desalination may increase water prices, induce uncontained urban growth, shift 209 
geopolitical relations of water security and increase dependence on technical expertise 210 
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as well (see McEvoy and Wilder, 2012). All in all, desalination creates a path 211 
dependency and may reduce the incentives to adapt to water stress with other means 212 
while reducing flexibility of change for future generations (Barnett and O’Neill, 2010). 213 
Desalination, finally, and as happens with other large-scale water projects, such as water 214 
transfers, may fall prey to misleading projections of water demand based on scenarios of 215 
intense agricultural, urban and tourist growth. 216 
 217 
3. Desalination in the Spanish Mediterranean Coast: The AGUA Program of 2004  218 
Spain is a perfect example of how the command-and-control approach in water 219 
resources planning and management  (López-Gunn, 2009) has been articulated through 220 
large engineering systems and centralized forms of governance (Saurí and del Moral, 221 
2001 and Bakker, 2002) leaving a very discernible print on the landscape 222 
(Swyngedouw, 1999 and 2007). Put more bluntly, water supply in Spain throughout the 223 
20th century has been based on building and enlarging water infrastructure rather than 224 
focusing on demand management. Despite being challenged, this approach mutates with 225 
the use of new technologies, such as desalination plants. The endless faith in technology 226 
to tame and produce new water flows is arguably the most widely shared ideology in 227 
water planning and management in Spain (March Corbella, 2010) and also in general all 228 
over the world at least until very recently. After dams and inter-basin water transfers, 229 
desalination has become the new alternative (Jefatura del Estado, 2004 and 2005) for 230 
solving the differences in supply between the “dry” and “wet” parts of the Iberian 231 
Peninsula. In recent years, desalination has substituted water transfers as a sort of new 232 
“cornucopia”, a symbol of water abundance, able in principle to solve future water 233 
needs of urban expansion (Swyngedouw, 2013).  234 
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In Spain, the desire to turn seawater into freshwater is anything but new. In 1965, the 235 
first desalination plant in Lanzarote (Canary Islands) was built. In the same year the 236 
newspaper La Vanguardia (12 October 1965) reported the attendance of Barcelona 237 
Water Company (SGAB) technicians and managers to the First Symposium on Water 238 
Desalination held in Washington. Interestingly, it was emphasized that the physical and 239 
social conditions of Spain would justify the study and implementation of such 240 
technologies at a large scale. Forty years later, the social and territorial upheaval 241 
produced by the Plan Hidrológico Nacional of 2001 (National Water Plan), including a 242 
large water transfer from the Ebro River to Eastern and South-eastern Spain, paved the 243 
way to the massive construction of desalination plants along the Mediterranean coast 244 
(Masjuan et al., 2008). We contend that desalination was seen as the cure for everything 245 
that dams and inter-basin water transfers were unable to solve, including droughts, 246 
scarcities, social conflicts, environmental impacts, and political rivalries among the 247 
different Spanish regions. Along those lines, one of the main mottos of the AGUA 248 
Program was “More water forever; the sea, an endless source of life” (translated from 249 
the Spanish, March Corbella, 2010, p.345). Desalination also meant a new and powerful 250 
element in water planning and management that could provide water for the continuous 251 
expansion of the urban and tourist growth machine in Mediterranean Spain and thus 252 
relax possible constraints on this growth. This new hydraulic structuralism did not 253 
challenge the foundation of Spanish water politics oriented towards agricultural and 254 
urban growth and helped to overcome the new challenges posed by suburbanization 255 
along the Spanish coast in terms of rapidly expanding water uses (gardens and 256 
swimming pools) (EEA, 2006, Larrabeiti Rodríguez, 2013 and Parés et al., 2013). 257 
Probably the main cause of the growth in desalination capacity in Spain during the last 258 
decades lies in the increasingly insurmountable difficulties faced by conventional water 259 
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supply projects and the concurrence of severe drought episodes. In the Spanish 260 
mainland desalination was not considered as an alternative until the very severe drought 261 
of 1991-95. During the extremely dry summer of 1995, the Spanish government 262 
announced the construction of a number of desalination plants in the coastal areas of 263 
Southern and South-eastern Spain. Due to the wet period after 1995, only the Cartagena 264 
plant was built. In 1996, desalted water use in Spain attained some 500,000 cubic 265 
meters per day, 60 per cent of which concentrated in the Balearic and Canary islands 266 
(Rico et al., 1998). Besides the islands, the other Spanish areas where desalination 267 
became important in the 1990s and early 2000s were the coast of Málaga (where 268 
according to some estimates, desalted water may cover up to 40 per cent of the water 269 
needs of the Costa del Sol) and the area served by the Mancomunidad de los Canales 270 
del Taibilla in the provinces of Murcia and Alicante. All in all, 95 per cent of desalted 271 
water served urban and tourist purposes and only 5 per cent went to irrigation (Olcina 272 
Cantos and Moltó Mantero, 2010). 273 
The national elections of 2000 gave the Popular Party a majority in the Spanish 274 
Parliament and therefore the political capacity to pursue a specific agenda for water 275 
planning and management. After several amendments to the Spanish Water Law of 276 
1985 (among them the possibility of creating controlled water markets) and the 277 
approval of basin plans for the major Spanish rivers, the Spanish government launched 278 
the so-called Plan Hidrológico Nacional (National Water Plan) (Jefatura del Estado, 279 
2001) which, as the most prominent feature, included the transfer of some 1,000 million 280 
cubic meters (henceforth MCM) of water from the Ebro river (the most important of 281 
Spain) to the Barcelona area (North) and to Valencia, Murcia and Almería (South). The 282 
Northern diversion, of about 200 kilometers, would help to alleviate the chronic water 283 
problems of Barcelona and its metropolitan region while the Southern diversion (up to 284 
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900 kilometers long) would provide for the needs of intensive agriculture and tourism in 285 
Eastern and South-eastern Spain.  286 
As expected, the planned Ebro diversion caused enthusiasm in Valencia and Murcia 287 
(political strongholds of the Popular Party), although not as much in Barcelona, and 288 
raised strong opposition in the Ebro basin, especially in Aragon, and above all, in the 289 
lower Ebro valley and delta. In this area, a social movement, the Ebro Platform, with the 290 
participation of almost all local political and civic associations was created and 291 
immediately began a campaign to stop the project. While the Spanish Ministry of the 292 
Environment (see Gil-Olcina and Rico, 2008) defended that the Ebro had sufficient 293 
water for these diversions without endangering in-stream flows, and above all, the 294 
future of the Ebro delta, this was highly questioned by the opponents to the plan 295 
(Masjuan et al., 2008). The Ebro Platform, and increasingly also the scientific 296 
community, argued that the Ebro diversion would result in the collapse of the delta, 297 
already threatened by coastal erosion, jeopardizing the future of the lower Ebro valley 298 
and delta and their ecological and economic functions (Masjuan et al., 2008). 299 
Furthermore, voices from the scientific community also argued that the calculations by 300 
the Spanish Ministry of the Environment missed likely declines in Ebro flows during 301 
the next decades because of climate change (reductions in precipitation in the 302 
headwaters of the Ebro catchment) and also because of an increase in evapotranspiration 303 
in the same catchments caused by an expanding forest cover on former agricultural and 304 
pasture land. 305 
The campaign against the plan included massive popular protests such as the large 306 
demonstrations in 2001 and 2002 in Barcelona, Zaragoza and Madrid as well as a 307 
“March to Brussels” followed by some 10,000 people. On their part, irrigation and 308 
tourist interests in Valencia and Murcia argued for the diversion under the slogan “Agua 309 
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para todos” (Water for all) and were able to mobilize large numbers of “Trasvase” 310 
(water transfer) defenders.  311 
The European Commission, which was asked to provide a substantial part (up to the 80 312 
per cent) of the 6,000 million euro project, also showed considerable concern about the 313 
impacts on the delta and hence was reluctant to participate (El País, 2002). At any rate, 314 
the Spanish government decided to pursue the diversion with or without European 315 
funding (El Periódico de Aragón, 2003).  316 
In March 2004, when national elections took place, some parts of the gigantic new 317 
water scheme were already under construction. However, the Popular Party lost these 318 
elections and the winning Socialist Party, who had opposed the Ebro project, formed the 319 
new Spanish government. One of the first actions taken by the Socialist government 320 
was to cancel the Ebro project and, as an alternative, implement the so-called 321 
“Programa AGUA” (AGUA Program) (Jefatura del Estado 2004, 2005 and Acuamed 322 
2013b), which, among other actions, envisaged the construction of a number of 323 
desalination plants along the Spanish Mediterranean coast in order to compensate for 324 
the lost flows of the Ebro River (see Table 1 for a list of desalination plants included in 325 
the AGUA Program). These plants would join the desalination plants already in 326 
operation, under construction or planned along the Mediterranean coast. As expected, 327 
the reaction of the regional governments of Valencia and Murcia (both in the hands of 328 
the Popular Party) was very hostile to this change, partly because of the need to pay for 329 
the desalted water at cost per cubic meter beyond the capacity of farmers who, on the 330 
other hand, expected water from the Ebro at subsidized, smaller costs. A war on the 331 
relative costs and benefits of desalted versus water diverted from the Ebro ensued in the 332 
following months with unclear results. On the other hand, the European Commission, 333 
through Cohesion Funds, assumed without much debate, an important share of the costs 334 
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of the Spanish desalination program (see Acuamed 2013a and 2013b) (up to 75 per cent 335 
of the total in some cases (such as the case of the desalination plant in Barcelona; see 336 
ATLL, 2014)) while it had been highly reluctant, as said before, to assume the costs of 337 
the Ebro project. Thus, out of the 3,600 million euro in the AGUA Program (not all of 338 
them for desalination plants as we will see) over 1,000 million euro came from 339 
European funds (Acuamed, 2013b). 340 
-table 1- 341 
The public company Sociedad Estatal de Aguas de las Cuencas Mediterráneas 342 
(Acuamed) led the development of an important part of the desalination plants included 343 
in the AGUA Program, with investments over 1,500 million euro (Acuamed, 2013b). 344 
To do so this state-owned society used their own funds, loans from financial organisms, 345 
among them the European Investment Bank, public funds from the European Union and 346 
contributions from the users. The construction of the plants, however, was handed out to 347 
private companies, most of them large contractors that had to adapt to the new paradigm 348 
once the Ebro transfer was cancelled. In table 1 (see also table 2 for the specific case of 349 
the Mancomunidad de los Canales del Taibilla) we can observe that while ownership of 350 
the desalination plants of the AGUA Program is held by the public sector (in many 351 
cases by Acuamed), plants were constructed by temporary consortiums (UTE in 352 
Spanish) of private companies, with an important presence of large Spanish contractors 353 
(Sacyr, FCC or Ferrovial) and international water utilities such as Veolia, Acciona and 354 
Suez Environnement. In most cases those companies have also assumed the operation 355 
and maintenance of the plants under a concession from 3 to 6 years (in the small plants) 356 
and from 15 to 25 years (in the big plants) (see tables 1 and 2). 357 
-table 2- 358 
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From 2004 onwards, the expansion of desalination in Spain proceeded at a fast pace 359 
beginning with the plants located in the more arid parts of Valencia, Murcia, and 360 
Almería (see table 1). However, a number of factors soon proved that the demand for 361 
desalted water was grossly overestimated. First of all, a succession of relatively wet 362 
years in Mediterranean Spain filled up reservoirs and aquifers whose water could be 363 
obtained at much lower costs. More importantly, the expectations of urban growth made 364 
some city councils sign agreements for co-financing desalination plants in order to 365 
avoid land use laws restricting development in areas with insufficient water resources. 366 
After the burst in the real estate market in 2008, thousands of projected new homes were 367 
cancelled making redundant the need of water and leaving some municipalities unable 368 
to comply with the agreements signed to use desalted water (see for instance El País, 369 
2012a). All in all, according to the Spanish Minister of Agriculture, Food and the 370 
Environment, in 2012 only 16 per cent of the total capacity of desalination plants in 371 
Spain was actually used (Cortes Generales, 2012, p.15). The disclosure of such data 372 
prompted the reaction of the European Commission who is now pressing Spain to 373 
justify the more than 1,000 million euro of European money spent in desalination in 374 
Spain during the last decade (El País, 2012b). 375 
To show a more detailed case study of the reality of desalination in the Mediterranean 376 
coast of Spain, next we turn to the case of the Mancomunidad de los Canales del 377 
Taibilla. 378 
 379 
4. Desalination and the reconfiguration of water supply sources in the 380 
Mancomunidad de los Canales del Taibilla  381 
The Mancomunidad de los Canales del Taibilla (henceforth MCT), an autonomous 382 
public company ascribed to the Spanish Ministry of Agriculture, Food and the 383 
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Environment, is the third largest regional water supply company of Spain (after those of 384 
Madrid and Barcelona). It serves 78 municipalities in the provinces of Alicante and 385 
Murcia with a total population of some 2.4 million people (plus an additional one 386 
million in summer) and covers an area of some 12,000 square kilometers (see Figure 1). 387 
Moreover, during drought periods the MCT may also provide water to other coastal 388 
areas in the north such as the giant tourist resort of Benidorm.  389 
-figure 1- 390 
The initial source of water was local, from the Taibilla River. In 1979, water from the 391 
aqueduct Tajo-Segura was also incorporated in the supply system to be followed by 392 
desalted water since 2003, and by water rights purchased to several farming 393 
communities along the Tajo River during the drought years of the late 2000s (see Figure 394 
2). This enhancement and diversification strategy followed the rationale of water supply 395 
augmentation through new resources, both conventional and non-conventional, 396 
especially after times of drought such as in the years 1981-1984, 1989-1990, 1991-397 
1995, and 2005-2009. Currently, the MCT operates two desalination plants in Alicante 398 
(Alicante I and II) and two in Murcia (San Pedro del Pinatar I and II) with a total 399 
capacity of 96 MCM per year (see table 2). Moreover, the MCT signed an agreement 400 
with Acuamed, the state-owned company in charge of implementing the AGUA 401 
Program, to use 40 MCM per year from the Torrevieja plant (still not operative in 402 
2013), 20 MCM per year from the Valdelentisco plant, and 10 MCM per year from the 403 
Águilas plant (see Figure 1). 404 
-figure 2- 405 
However, as we can see in figure 3, the MCT only used 44 MCM of desalted water in 406 
2012, mostly from Alicante I and San Pedro del Pinatar I plants, while virtually no 407 
water was used from the aforementioned Acuamed plants. These figures show that 408 
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desalination plants remain underused or even idle because desalination has not been 409 
able to capture the interests of water users in the area. Farmers, especially, are reluctant 410 
to sign up agreements with Acuamed because of the cost of desalted water. In part, this 411 
has been exacerbated by the strong increases of electricity bills since 2008 when, under 412 
direction from the European Union, Spain underwent the reform of the electricity 413 
market eliminating “protected tariffs”. In 2008, the toll fee for energy production 414 
oscillated between 0.012 and 0.014 €/kWh, while in 2012 it had risen to 0.024-0.044 415 
€/kWh1. This motivated a sharp increase in average electricity prices that, for industrial 416 
uses, grew from 0.08 €/kWh in 2007 to 0.14 €/kWh in 2012 (UNESA, 2013). Therefore, 417 
the increase in energy costs was the main driver behind the increase in production costs 418 
of desalted water from 0.32-0.36 €/m3, in 2008, to 0.56-0.63 €/m3 in 20122. Taking into 419 
account that the electricity bill might represent around 55 per cent of the operation and 420 
maintenance costs of a desalination plant3, it could be estimated that given current 421 
energy costs the real cost of producing desalted water would be situated between 0.9 422 
and 1 €/m3 if we take into account all ancillary charges. These real costs coincide with 423 
those calculated by the analysis of the real cost of water produced by the desalination 424 
plants of the AGUA Program by Del Villar García (in press). For instance, for the 425 
Mutxamel plant Del Villar García (in press) calculates a cost of 1.11 €/m3 and for the 426 
plant in Torrevieja a cost of 1.03 €/m3. Those figures, thus, are considerably higher than 427 
                                                           
1
 The interval indicates the fluctuation between diurnal and nocturnal electricity rates. 
2
 Assuming that that average electricity consumption in a state-of-the-art desalination plant with energy 
recovery mechanisms oscillates between 4 and 4.5 kWh/m3   
3 This figure varies from one plant to another. But for instance, in the case of the desalination plant of 
Barcelona energy costs are estimated to represent 64 per cent of operation costs (Campos, 2009), while 
from the data by Acuamed (2007) and Acuasegura (2007) for the Mutxamel and Valdelentisco plants it 
can be calculated a percentage around 55.7 and 55.3, respectively. However, from the data presented by 
Estevan (2008b) we can observe that this percentage might vary across years, location characteristics of 
the plant, and capacity and operation routines of the plant. 
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the figure estimated in 2007 by Acuamed whose design projects for plants in the MCT 428 
area envisaged costs between 0.58 €/m3 in the Valdelentisco plant (70 MCM/year) and 429 
0.68 €/m3 in the Mutxamel plant (18 MCM/year) (Acuamed, 2007, Acuasegura, 2007 430 
and Ministerio de Agricultura, Alimentación y Medio Ambiente, 2013a). At these cost 431 
levels, farmers, who pay around 0.10 €/m3 for subsidized surface water (Ministerio de 432 
Agricultura, Alimentación y Medio Ambiente, 2013b) plus the costs of the irrigation 433 
communities (with a final price of water normally between 0.20 and 0.30 €/m3), are 434 
unable to afford desalted water unless a subsidy (above 0.60 €/m3) is provided (Rico-435 
Amorós, 2010).  436 
-figure 3- 437 
The evolution of urban and tourist water consumption in the 1990s and early 2000s, on 438 
the other hand, appeared to justify the recourse to desalination. Until the early 1990s, 439 
water consumption grew especially in the coastal towns but from then onwards urban 440 
expansion also engulfed municipalities located inland. One stunning example is 441 
Torrevieja, the water consumption of which increased from 0.8 MCM in 1975 to more 442 
than 4 MCM in 1994, as a result of the creation of more than 1,400 hectares of new 443 
urban land and the presence of some 400,000 people in summer (Rico Amorós, 2007).  444 
During the second part of the 1980s, water served by the MCT increased from 131.2 445 
MCM per year in 1984 to 191.3 MCM in 1991. This was to a large extent related to a 446 
vigorous demand by tourist areas. However, in 1991 a drought cycle began affecting 447 
much of Spain to the point that, in the MCT case, water served had fallen to 167 MCM 448 
in 1996. From this year onwards, consumption recovered and expanded again to reach 449 
225 MCM in 2007 (Figure 2) (Andrés Martínez, pers. comm., 2013). This trend, 450 
however, presented a rather marked unevenness and thus in large cities such as 451 
Alicante, Elche or Murcia, stabilization or even decrease could already be noted in the 452 
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1990s. Most of the growth in water consumption, therefore, took place in medium and 453 
small urban and tourist settlements. 454 
 455 
5. Desalination, decreasing consumption and the collapse of urban growth in 456 
Mediterranean Spain  457 
The first half of the 2000s coincided with the real estate boom in the MCT area and in 458 
the Mediterranean coast in general upon which, and as argued before, the construction 459 
of desalination plants under the AGUA Program was justified. Nevertheless, since 460 
2007, or even before as we have shown for some municipalities, many cities and tourist 461 
centers of the Spanish Mediterranean coast began to observe a decrease in water 462 
consumption (AEAS and AGA, 2012). There are a number of factors that may explain 463 
this trend. At the household level reductions in consumption are, in part, responses to 464 
water conservation and awareness campaigns (March et al., 2013) or socio-demographic 465 
changes (March et al., 2012). Perhaps more important are technical improvements in 466 
water delivery systems reducing leaks and other losses. Better delivery systems have 467 
implied that the efficiency of the water network serving urban households in the larger 468 
cities of Valencia and Murcia has increased and, consequently, the final consumption 469 
has decreased (Asunción Martínez, pers. comm., 2013). Alicante, for instance, went 470 
from 30.7 MCM in 2004 to 29.4 MCM in 2006 with an overall efficiency in distribution 471 
of 85 per cent. Perhaps the most striking aspect in this respect is the city of Murcia. In 472 
1987 when the resident population was 309,000, water delivered to the municipal 473 
network attained 35.8 MCM but water finally metered in households was only 18.9 474 
MCM. In other words, the efficiency of the network barely reached 57 per cent. In 475 
2006, with a population of 427,000, water consumption had fallen to 34 MCM (of water 476 
delivered to the city) thanks to a large extent, to improvements in the network that made 477 
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efficiency rise to 85 per cent of the water delivered (Gil Olcina and Rico Amorós, 478 
2008). Figures are even better in tourist areas with concentrated, vertical urbanism (i.e. 479 
high density multi-storey buildings) such as Benidorm, where efficiencies attain 90 per 480 
cent or more (Rico et al., 2009 and Rico et al., 2013). 481 
At the same time, projected upward trends in water demand due to the continuous 482 
expansion of urbanization failed to materialize with the collapse of the real estate sector 483 
beginning in 2008. For example, in Valencia, in 2005 some 227,000 housing permits 484 
were granted by local planning commissions. In 2011, this figure had been reduced to 485 
23,000; that is only 10 per cent of those given six years before (Hernández et al., 486 
submitted). 487 
Both factors have contributed to the downward trend in water consumption in the MCT 488 
area observed since 2007. In 2010 the total quantity of water delivered to the system, 489 
201 MCM, contrasts with the 234 MCM delivered in 2008 (see Figure 2). Regarding 490 
sources, both the amount received from the Tajo-Segura aqueduct and of desalination 491 
plants decreased whereas the amount provided by the Taibilla River had increased 492 
thanks to a series of relatively wet years in the area. Reductions in water delivered, as 493 
said, are largely attributable to reductions in demand in municipalities which may have 494 
fallen between 5 and 10 per cent between 2004 and 2010, or even more in the larger 495 
municipalities such as Alicante or Elche where the reduction attains 15 per cent in the 496 
first case and 17 per cent in the second (Asunción Martínez, pers. comm., 2013). 497 
According to studies in the mid-2000s (Confederación Hidrográfica del Segura, 2007) 498 
water demand in 2025 in the MCT area would be situated in the vicinity of 340 MCM a 499 
year. In 2012, the water supply potential of the MCT amounted to 361 MCM per year 500 
provided by the Tajo-Segura Aqueduct (131 MCM), the Taibilla River (70 MCM), and 501 
desalination plants (160 MCM). Moreover, agreements with irrigation communities 502 
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along the Tajo River could add an extra 36 MCM. Hence, the total capacity of the 503 
system could approach 400 MCM/year. This contrasts with a demand that in 2012 had 504 
declined to 194 MCM. After these trends, the Confederación Hidrográfica del Segura 505 
(2013) lowered substantially the water demand figure expected for 2015 and 2027 to 506 
220 and 257 MCM, respectively. All in all, therefore, the capacity of the MCT system 507 
exceeds by more than 200 MCM the current demand. While this margin appears wide 508 
enough to offset scarcities caused by future droughts (thanks to the extra capacity of 509 
desalination plants) it is also true that the cost of “secure” (i.e. desalted) water would 510 
only be affordable by urban and tourist interests and not by farmers who currently use 511 
only a very small fraction of the total desalted water produced. As Rico-Amorós (2010) 512 
points out, very few farmers can assume costs of water beyond 0.20-0.30 €/m3 no matter 513 
how secure and reliable the source may be as it is with desalination. Farmers therefore 514 
turn to other options such as treated wastewater, water purchased from other irrigation 515 
communities, or even desalted water mixed with other water sources to decrease costs. 516 
 517 
6. Conclusions: Desalination, cornucopia for whom?   518 
In this paper we have focused on the expansion of desalination in Spain since the mid-519 
2000s, which we have defined as the newest mutation of a water planning and 520 
management approach strongly based in the enhancement of water supply sources rather 521 
than in the management of water demand. We have situated the emergence and 522 
expansion of desalination in this country within the debates and conflicts surrounding 523 
the National Water Plan of 2001 and the cancellation of the Ebro transfer to 524 
Mediterranean regions in 2004. Under the name of AGUA Program, desalination at a 525 
grand scale was offered to the Spanish Mediterranean Coast as a conflict-free alternative 526 
 23
to provide water for presumably booming agriculture and, especially, urban –tourist 527 
demands.  528 
The rationale of desalination was built on two premises. First, costs at least equal or 529 
inferior to other large-scale alternatives, and second, expanding demand after the boom 530 
in the urban and tourist sector of the mid-2000s. Both premises failed to materialize 531 
because costs (and more so after the important price hikes in electricity in Spain since 532 
2008) made desalted water unaffordable for some users, such as farmers, and 533 
uncompetitive for urban and tourist users who could access cheaper water sources. 534 
Likewise the expected increase in water demand linked to the massive urbanization of 535 
the Mediterranean coast also failed to materialize after the burst of the real estate bubble 536 
in 2008. But there are other causes also partially responsible for the failure of 537 
desalination; among them a relatively benign climatology with abundant precipitation in 538 
the last 4-5 years and also important structural changes in water demand such as the 539 
increase in the efficiency of the delivery networks. 540 
In 2013, many desalination plants operate at a very low capacity, the construction of 541 
others suffers considerable delays, and still others may not be built as envisaged, at least 542 
in the short and medium term (see Table 1). The overcapacity in water production 543 
contrasts with the economic, social and territorial landscape left by the real estate crisis 544 
and the many unfinished residential developments that supposedly were to be “watered” 545 
by desalination. In one sense, desalination is no different than other large-scale and 546 
costly infrastructure planned and built during the years of the Spanish economic 547 
“miracle” be these power plants, high speed train lines or convention centers; and in that 548 
sense desalination plants are a continuation of the business-model of the hydraulic 549 
Spanish paradigm with big contractors being awarded lucrative concessions. We have 550 
observed that despite publicly-led, the construction and operation of desalination was 551 
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handed out to building companies and water utilities, which quickly adapted to the new 552 
water supply framework, in which desalination had a major role. It is not a coincidence, 553 
therefore, that 6 out of the top 20 world desalination water providers were Spanish 554 
companies: Befesa Agua, ACS, Acciona Agua, Sadyt, Cadagua and Aqualia (Fundación 555 
Cajamar, 2009).  556 
Desalination also exemplifies the continuation of the subordination of water planning to 557 
urban and regional planning based on growth scenarios. Rather paradoxically but 558 
perhaps not surprisingly, the failure of harmonizing both planning processes has not 559 
resulted in insufficient water quantities to cover demand but rather in overcapacity in 560 
the water supply system. We argue that the massively idle capacity of desalination 561 
plants in Spain is the result of a mismatch between forecasted scenarios of intensive 562 
urbanization and ensuing increase in water demand and the harsh reality brought about 563 
by the economic crisis since 2008. To a much lesser extent this overcapacity could be 564 
attributed to the conscious decision to have a strategic water reserve.  565 
While this overcapacity diminishes the risks of future droughts, the fact that to a large 566 
extent it is based on desalination introduces the issue of relative scarcities. In other 567 
words, water scarcity for the urban and tourist sectors of the Spanish Mediterranean 568 
coast could be overcome with desalination but water scarcity for agricultural users 569 
would not vanish but probably become more common as traditional supplies dwindle 570 
and the area moves into the next dry cycle. 571 
In a context of more promising alternatives, some of them already considered by the 572 
AGUA Program, desalination (as water transfers) appears to be increasingly 573 
problematic (Olcina- Cantos et al., 2010). Those alternatives might include local-based 574 
sources such as treated wastewater use, greywater reuse or rainwater harvesting (despite 575 
issues on acceptability or energy use in some of them) (Baldwin and Uhlman, 2010, 576 
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Domènech et al., 2013 and Domènech et al. 2014). It may also include the proliferation 577 
of water trading mechanisms, if they do not compromise environmental flows and 578 
socio-economic life of the population in the donor basins, between the farming sector 579 
and urban and tourist centers for exchange of water of different qualities (already active 580 
in places such as Benidorm, see Rico et al., 2013). But above all, it should include water 581 
demand management measures.  582 
In this sense and as the newest expression of the hydraulic paradigm, with large 583 
investments locked in (sometimes redundant) infrastructure, desalination will occupy an 584 
important role in Spanish water planning and management in the coming years but 585 
probably not the leading role as the AGUA Program envisaged. The Spanish case may 586 
serve as an example, altogether with other examples such as Australia (Baldwin and 587 
Ulhman, 2010), of the need to be cautious when preparing water plans strongly based in 588 
just one source of supply ignoring more integrative views (including other water 589 
alternatives), accurate forecasts and projections of water demand, and integration 590 
between water and urban/regional planning scenarios.  591 
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